In The Ray Charles Foundation v. Robinson (C.D. Cal.
12-cv-2725), the court takes an interesting side-step around what will
undoubtedly be the hottest copyright issue in the very near future –
termination. The musician Ray Charles composed and recorded numerous
musical works which were copyrighted. From the facts listed in the case,
it is an open question about whether the works were works made for hire with
Atlantic (sound recording) and Progressive (composition).
Charles negotiated new terms (including royalties) for these works with the
record companies.
Prior to Charles’s death, he made an agreement with his 12
children which stated:
My father, Ray Charles Robinson,
has told me that he will set up an irrevocable trust for my benefit, to be
funded with $500,000. This gift is my entire inheritance from him and I
understand that I will not inherit anything further under my father’s estate
plan and that I am waiving any right to make a claim against his estate.
Upon his death, the rights in his works were left to The Ray
Charles Foundation. In 2010, seven of Charles’s children served copyright
termination notices on parties who had interests in Charles’s works, including
Progressive.
The Ray Charles Foundation sued the children claiming a
breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment on a variety of
grounds. The Foundation alleged that Charles’s works were works made for
hire and thus not subject to the termination provisions of the Copyright Act.
17 U.S.C. Section 203 (thus maintaining the Foundation’s continued
royalties).
However, the Court was unsympathetic to The Foundation’s
claims. First, it found that the termination notices are not claims
against the Charles estate. The estate was closed in 2006, 4 years before
the termination notices were served in 2010. Second, the Foundation’s
claim that Charles’s works were works made for hire would mean that the works
were never in the estate anyway. Third, even if the works were not works
made for hire, the Court cannot interpret Charles’s agreement with his children
as limiting a termination right under the Copyright Act. The termination
rights are unalienable notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.
17 U.S.C. Section 304(c)(5). The Court finds that the language
would be an agreement to the contrary and is not able to prevent the right to
terminate. The Court goes on to award attorney’s fees to the Defendant
under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute.
The Court does not stop there. It found that The
Foundation does not even have standing to bring the lawsuit. The
Foundation is not the owner of Charles’s works if they are a work made for
hire. (Progressive and/or Atlantic would be.) The Court further found
that The Foundation is not within the zone of interests protected by the
statute invoked in the lawsuit. The statutes (Sections 203 and 304)
provide for authors, statutory heirs owning a termination interest, and
grantees of transferees and their successors as those within the zone of interests.
While beneficial owners may have the right to sue for
infringement under Section 501(b), no similar provision exists under Section
203 or 304 for the right to terminate. Thus, the Court also rejects The
Foundation’s claim that they have standing as a beneficial owner.
Finally, the Court rejects The Foundation’s third-party standing argument
because it cannot show a close relationship with Progressive or its
successors-in-interest.
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